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What is asymmetric information?

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Quick answer

Asymmetric information is a situation in which one side of a deal knows something important that the other side does not: the seller of a used car knows its faults, and a person buying insurance knows how careful they are. It can drive good products out of a market (adverse selection) or change behavior after the deal (moral hazard).

The topic explained

When one side knows more

Markets work well when buyers and sellers know what is being traded. Asymmetric information means that one side knows more than the other about something that matters to the price. The seller of a used car knows whether it has been in an accident; the buyer sees only a clean car. A person buying health insurance knows more about their own health than the insurer does.

George Akerlof showed in 1970, in a paper called “The Market for Lemons”, that this gap alone can make a market shrink or vanish, even when every buyer and every seller would gain from trading. In American slang a lemon is a bad car. In 2001 Akerlof shared the Nobel memorial prize in economics with Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz for their analyses of markets with asymmetric information.

A loop of four boxes: buyers offer an average price, owners of good cars withdraw them, the average quality on sale falls, and buyers offer less, which starts the loop again.Buyers pay averageGood cars leaveQuality fallsBuyers pay less
The lemons loop: each round leaves worse cars on the market.

The market for lemons, step by step

Suppose half the used cars of a model are good and half are lemons (numbers made up for this page). A good car is worth ₪60,000 to a buyer, and its owner would sell it for ₪50,000. A lemon is worth ₪20,000, and its owner would sell it for ₪15,000. If buyers could tell them apart, every car would be sold.

Buyers cannot tell, so they offer what an average car is worth: 12⋅60,000+12⋅20,000=40,000\frac{1}{2} \cdot 60{,}000 + \frac{1}{2} \cdot 20{,}000 = 40{,}000 shekels. At that price the owners of good cars, who want at least ₪50,000, keep them. Only lemons are left for sale, buyers come to expect a lemon, and the price falls to ₪20,000. This is adverse selection: the hidden quality selects the worst goods into the market. Each good car that is not sold wastes a gain of 60,000−50,000=10,00060{,}000 - 50{,}000 = 10{,}000 shekels that buyer and seller would have shared.

A table of the used-car example: a good car is worth ₪60,000 to a buyer and its seller accepts ₪50,000; a lemon is worth ₪20,000 and its seller accepts ₪15,000; a buyer who cannot tell offers the average, ₪40,000.CarWorth to buyerSeller acceptsGood car₪60,000₪50,000Lemon₪20,000₪15,000Average offer₪40,000
Half the cars are good and half are lemons. Numbers made up for the page.

Moral hazard: hidden behavior after the deal

Moral hazard is the second problem: after a deal, one side changes its behavior in a way the other cannot see. Take a phone worth ₪3,000. A careful owner has a 10% chance of breaking it in a year, so the expected cost is 0.1⋅3,000=3000.1 \cdot 3{,}000 = 300 shekels. Once fully insured, the owner may take less care, the chance rises to 20%, and the expected payout doubles to ₪600. An insurer who priced the policy at ₪300 loses money.

The usual answer is a deductible (השתתפות עצמית): the owner pays the first part of every loss. With a deductible of ₪1,000, a careless owner bears 0.2⋅1,000=2000.2 \cdot 1{,}000 = 200 shekels a year of the risk, enough reason to take care again.

Narrowing the gap, and a common mistake

Markets and governments have ways to narrow the gap. The informed side can send a signal: a seller offers a warranty that only an owner of a good car can afford to give, and Spence argued in 1973 that a degree can signal ability to an employer. The uninformed side can screen: an insurer offers a cheap policy with a high deductible and an expensive one without, and each customer's choice reveals their risk. Governments require disclosure, inspections and licenses, and some make insurance compulsory, so that low risks cannot leave the pool.

The common mistake is to confuse the two problems. Adverse selection is about hidden quality before the deal; moral hazard is about hidden behavior after it. Ask what is hidden and when, as in the table.

A table comparing adverse selection and moral hazard: what is hidden (quality or type, against behavior), when (before the deal, against after), an example (a used car, an insured phone) and a remedy (a warranty or signal, a deductible).Adverse selectionMoral hazardWhat is hiddenquality or typebehaviorWhenbefore the dealafter the dealExamplea used caran insured phoneRemedywarranty, signaldeductible
Free printable worksheet

Practice: asymmetric information

For 11th grade economics students. Use the tables and the loop on the sheet, show each calculation, then check against the answers.

Free, no sign-up. The answer key prints on the second page. Regenerating a new worksheet on the same topic needs a free account.

Free printable worksheetlessoons.com
Practice: asymmetric informationName:
  1. Define asymmetric information, and give one example from everyday life.

  2. Use the table. Half the cars are good and half are lemons. What will a buyer who cannot tell them apart offer? Will good cars be sold?

    A table of a second used-car market: a good car is worth ₪80,000 to a buyer and its seller accepts ₪70,000; a lemon is worth ₪30,000 and its seller accepts ₪25,000; the average offer is a question mark.CarWorth to buyerSeller acceptsGood car₪80,000₪70,000Lemon₪30,000₪25,000Average offer?
  3. In the same market 90% of the cars are good. Compute the average offer again. Are good cars sold now?

  4. Write in the table whether each case is adverse selection or moral hazard.

    A table of three cases with an empty column: life insurance bought when already ill; a rented car driven roughly; the riskiest borrowers are the keenest to borrow.CaseWhich problem?Life cover bought when ill?Rented car driven roughly?Worst borrowers want loans?
  5. Fill in the expected payouts in the insurance table. Why may an insurer that charges ₪100 lose money?

    A table for insuring a phone worth ₪2,000: a careful owner has a 5% chance of a loss and a careless one 15%; the expected payout for each is a question mark.Phone of ₪2,000Chance of lossExpected payoutCareful owner5%?Careless owner15%?
  6. Fill in the blank box of the loop, and name the problem it shows.

    A loop of four boxes for an insurance market: the insurer sets one price for all, low risks leave, a blank box with a question mark, and the price rises again.One price for allLow risks leave?Price rises again
  7. Name one signal and one screen, and say which side of the market uses each.

  8. Write a short paragraph: why may a law that makes car insurance compulsory help the market, and what does it cost?

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Common questions

What is the difference between adverse selection and moral hazard?

Adverse selection comes from hidden quality or type before a deal, such as a seller who knows the car is bad. Moral hazard comes from hidden behavior after a deal, such as an insured person who takes less care.

Why is it called the market for lemons?

In American slang a lemon is a car with hidden faults. Akerlof used used cars as his example in 1970 to show that buyers who cannot judge quality can drive good cars out of the market.

What is signaling in economics?

An action by the informed side that is costly for a bad type and cheap for a good one, so it reveals quality: a long warranty, a costly degree, a brand built over years.

Is asymmetric information a market failure?

Yes. Trades that would benefit both sides do not happen, or happen on the wrong terms, so the market does not reach an efficient outcome. That is why it is taught with externalities and public goods.

How is asymmetric information asked on the bagrut?

Students explain adverse selection with the used-car example, compute an average offer, tell adverse selection from moral hazard in described cases, and name a remedy such as a warranty, a deductible or a law.

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