- Jewish Thought: Questions and Thinkers
How can God know the future if we have free will?
The question of free will and divine foreknowledge asks how a person can choose freely if God already knows the choice. Rabbi Akiva holds both: “הכל צפוי והרשות נתונה” (all is foreseen, and permission is given, Avot 3:15). Saadia Gaon answers that knowing is not causing; Maimonides, that God's knowledge is beyond human grasp; Gersonides and Crescas each give up part of one side.
The topic explained
The question: can a known choice be free?
Jewish thought holds two things at once. A person chooses: Maimonides opens chapter 5 of Hilkhot Teshuvah (the Laws of Repentance) with “רשות לכל אדם נתונה” (permission is given to every person, 5:1), and calls this free will “עמוד התורה והמצוה” (the pillar of the Torah and the commandment, 5:3). And God knows everything, including what has not yet happened: divine foreknowledge. Rabbi Akiva puts both in one line: “הכל צפוי והרשות נתונה” (all is foreseen, and permission is given, Avot 3:15).
Maimonides states the difficulty sharply in 5:5. If God knows that a person will be righteous, “אי אפשר שלא יהיה צדיק” (it is impossible that he will not be righteous); and if he can still turn out wicked, then God did not really know. The common mistake is to think the problem is God's power, that God forces the choice. The problem is knowledge alone: even a God who forces nothing seems to fix the future simply by knowing it.
Saadia Gaon: knowing is not causing
Saadia Gaon (882–942) takes up the question in the fourth treatise of Emunot ve-Deot (Beliefs and Opinions). His answer: “אין לו ראיה שידיעת הבורא את הדברים הם סבת היותם” (he has no proof that the Creator's knowledge of things is the cause of their being, 4:4). If knowledge caused things, he adds, things would be eternal, since God's knowledge of them is eternal.
God knows what a person will do because the person will choose it, not the other way around: had the person chosen to stay silent instead of speaking, says Saadia, God would have known the silence. A comparison of our own: watching a recording of a match, you know the final score, yet your knowing made no one score. Notice the weak point, which a good answer names: God knows before the act, not after it, so the question whether the act could still turn out otherwise is still open.
Maimonides and the Raavad: beyond our grasp
Maimonides answers differently in 5:5. A person and his knowledge are two things, but God “ודעתו אחד” (and His knowledge are one), so just as no person can grasp God, no person can grasp God's knowledge: “אין בנו כח לידע היאך ידע הקדוש ברוך הוא כל הברואים והמעשים” (we have no power to know how the Holy One, blessed be He, knows all creatures and deeds), “אבל נדע בלא ספק שמעשה האדם ביד האדם” (but we know without doubt that a person's deeds are in the person's hands).
The Raavad (Rabbi Abraham ben David of Posquières, 12th century) objected in his gloss: “לא נהג זה המחבר מנהג החכמים” (this author did not follow the way of the sages), for he raised a hard question and left it open. His own answer: “אין ידיעתו גזירה” (His knowledge is not a decree); it is “כידיעת האצטגנינים” (like the knowledge of the astrologers), who foresee a person's path without forcing it.
Giving something up, and why it matters
Two later thinkers each keep one side whole. Gersonides (Levi ben Gershom, 1288–1344), in The Wars of the Lord, holds that God knows the options open to a person but not which one a free person will take: freedom stays whole, foreknowledge is limited. Hasdai Crescas (died about 1410), in Or Hashem (The Light of the Lord), holds the reverse: a choice feels free but follows from its causes, so God, the first cause, knows it.
Why it matters: reward and punishment. If God decreed people's deeds, Maimonides asks, why command them at all, and “ובאי זה דין ואיזה משפט נפרע מן הרשע או משלם שכר לצדיק” (by what justice or what law would He punish the wicked or reward the righteous, 5:4)? A strong exam answer states the contradiction, sets out two answers, and says what each one keeps and what it gives up.
Practice: free will and divine foreknowledge
For 11th grade students of Jewish thought. Read the sources printed on the sheet, answer each question, then check your work against the answers.
Free, no sign-up. The answer key prints on the second page. Regenerating a new worksheet on the same topic needs a free account.
Rabbi Akiva says: “הכל צפוי והרשות נתונה” (all is foreseen, and permission is given, Avot 3:15). Which half of the sentence speaks of divine foreknowledge, and which of free will?
The diagram sets out the difficulty in Hilkhot Teshuvah 5:5. Write the missing third step.
Saadia Gaon writes: “אין לו ראיה שידיעת הבורא את הדברים הם סבת היותם” (he has no proof that the Creator's knowledge of things is the cause of their being). Explain his answer in your own words, with an example.
Maimonides writes: “אין בנו כח לידע היאך ידע הקדוש ברוך הוא כל הברואים והמעשים” (we have no power to know how the Holy One, blessed be He, knows all creatures and deeds). Why did the Raavad object, and what answer did he offer instead?
Fill in the two empty boxes in the table.
Maimonides asks: “ובאי זה דין ואיזה משפט נפרע מן הרשע או משלם שכר לצדיק” (by what justice or what law would He punish the wicked or reward the righteous, 5:4). Write the missing step of his argument in the diagram.
Gersonides and Crescas each give something up. Which part does each give up, and what does each gain?
Write a paragraph: which answer convinces you most? State the difficulty, give the answer with a quotation from this sheet, raise one objection and reply to it.
Common questions
Who said all is foreseen and permission is given?
Rabbi Akiva, in the Mishnah, Avot 3:15. In one short sentence he holds both sides of the question: God sees everything in advance, and the choice is still given to the person.
Does Maimonides solve the problem?
Not by explaining it. In Hilkhot Teshuvah 5:5 he says that God's knowledge is one with God and so beyond human grasp, and that we know with certainty that a person's deeds are in the person's hands. The Raavad criticized him for leaving the question open.
Is free will one of the thirteen principles of faith?
No. Maimonides' thirteen principles do not list it, but in Hilkhot Teshuvah 5:3 he calls free will a great principle and the pillar of the Torah and the commandment, since without it command, reward and punishment make no sense.
What is the difference between knowing and decreeing?
To decree is to determine that something will happen; to know is only to be aware of it. Saadia and the Raavad build their answers on this difference: God's knowledge of a choice, they hold, is not what makes the person choose.
How do I answer an exam question on knowledge and choice?
State the contradiction in one sentence, quote Avot 3:15 or Hilkhot Teshuvah 5:5, present at least two thinkers' answers in their own terms, and say what each answer keeps and gives up. Do not present one answer as the only Jewish view.

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