# What is asymmetric information?

> Written with AI · [Taxes, subsidies and market failure](https://lessoons.com/en/taxes-and-market-failure) · Grade 11 · 2026-11-13 · https://lessoons.com/en/taxes-and-market-failure/what-is-asymmetric-information

Asymmetric information is a situation in which one side of a deal knows something important that the other side does not: the seller of a used car knows its faults, and a person buying insurance knows how careful they are. It can drive good products out of a market (adverse selection) or change behavior after the deal (moral hazard).

## The topic explained

### When one side knows more

Markets work well when buyers and sellers know what is being traded. Asymmetric information means that one side knows more than the other about something that matters to the price. The seller of a used car knows whether it has been in an accident; the buyer sees only a clean car. A person buying health insurance knows more about their own health than the insurer does.

George Akerlof showed in 1970, in a paper called “The Market for Lemons”, that this gap alone can make a market shrink or vanish, even when every buyer and every seller would gain from trading. In American slang a lemon is a bad car. In 2001 Akerlof shared the Nobel memorial prize in economics with Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz for their analyses of markets with asymmetric information.

### The market for lemons, step by step

Suppose half the used cars of a model are good and half are lemons (numbers made up for this page). A good car is worth ₪60,000 to a buyer, and its owner would sell it for ₪50,000. A lemon is worth ₪20,000, and its owner would sell it for ₪15,000. If buyers could tell them apart, every car would be sold.

Buyers cannot tell, so they offer what an average car is worth: 1/2 · 60,000 + 1/2 · 20,000 = 40,000 shekels. At that price the owners of good cars, who want at least ₪50,000, keep them. Only lemons are left for sale, buyers come to expect a lemon, and the price falls to ₪20,000. This is adverse selection: the hidden quality selects the worst goods into the market. Each good car that is not sold wastes a gain of 60,000 - 50,000 = 10,000 shekels that buyer and seller would have shared.

### Moral hazard: hidden behavior after the deal

Moral hazard is the second problem: after a deal, one side changes its behavior in a way the other cannot see. Take a phone worth ₪3,000. A careful owner has a 10% chance of breaking it in a year, so the expected cost is 0.1 · 3,000 = 300 shekels. Once fully insured, the owner may take less care, the chance rises to 20%, and the expected payout doubles to ₪600. An insurer who priced the policy at ₪300 loses money.

The usual answer is a deductible (השתתפות עצמית): the owner pays the first part of every loss. With a deductible of ₪1,000, a careless owner bears 0.2 · 1,000 = 200 shekels a year of the risk, enough reason to take care again.

### Narrowing the gap, and a common mistake

Markets and governments have ways to narrow the gap. The informed side can send a signal: a seller offers a warranty that only an owner of a good car can afford to give, and Spence argued in 1973 that a degree can signal ability to an employer. The uninformed side can screen: an insurer offers a cheap policy with a high deductible and an expensive one without, and each customer's choice reveals their risk. Governments require disclosure, inspections and licenses, and some make insurance compulsory, so that low risks cannot leave the pool.

The common mistake is to confuse the two problems. Adverse selection is about hidden quality before the deal; moral hazard is about hidden behavior after it. Ask what is hidden and when, as in the table.

## Practice: asymmetric information

For 11th grade economics students. Use the tables and the loop on the sheet, show each calculation, then check against the answers.

1. **Define asymmetric information, and give one example from everyday life.** — One side of a deal knows something that matters to the price and the other side does not. Example: the seller of a used car knows its faults and the buyer does not.
2. **Use the table. Half the cars are good and half are lemons. What will a buyer who cannot tell them apart offer? Will good cars be sold?** — 1/2 · 80,000 + 1/2 · 30,000 = 55,000 shekels. Owners of good cars want ₪70,000, so they keep them and only lemons are sold.
3. **In the same market 90% of the cars are good. Compute the average offer again. Are good cars sold now?** — 0.9 · 80,000 + 0.1 · 30,000 = 75,000 shekels, above the ₪70,000 that owners of good cars want, so good cars are sold too.
4. **Write in the table whether each case is adverse selection or moral hazard.** — Life insurance bought when already ill: adverse selection (hidden type before the deal). A rented car driven roughly: moral hazard (hidden behavior after). The riskiest borrowers seeking loans: adverse selection.
5. **Fill in the expected payouts in the insurance table. Why may an insurer that charges ₪100 lose money?** — Careful: 0.05 · 2,000 = 100 shekels. Careless: 0.15 · 2,000 = 300 shekels. Once insured, owners may take less care, so the payout rises above the ₪100 charged.
6. **Fill in the blank box of the loop, and name the problem it shows.** — The average risk of those still insured rises. This is adverse selection: each price rise drives out the safest customers, so the pool gets riskier.
7. **Name one signal and one screen, and say which side of the market uses each.** — A signal is sent by the informed side, such as a seller's warranty or a job seeker's degree. A screen is used by the uninformed side, such as an insurer's menu of policies with different deductibles.
8. **Write a short paragraph: why may a law that makes car insurance compulsory help the market, and what does it cost?** — A good answer says that if everyone must insure, low-risk drivers cannot leave the pool, so the price does not spiral up and the market does not shrink. The cost is that low-risk drivers pay more than their own risk, and the law takes away a choice.

## Common questions

### What is the difference between adverse selection and moral hazard?

Adverse selection comes from hidden quality or type before a deal, such as a seller who knows the car is bad. Moral hazard comes from hidden behavior after a deal, such as an insured person who takes less care.

### Why is it called the market for lemons?

In American slang a lemon is a car with hidden faults. Akerlof used used cars as his example in 1970 to show that buyers who cannot judge quality can drive good cars out of the market.

### What is signaling in economics?

An action by the informed side that is costly for a bad type and cheap for a good one, so it reveals quality: a long warranty, a costly degree, a brand built over years.

### Is asymmetric information a market failure?

Yes. Trades that would benefit both sides do not happen, or happen on the wrong terms, so the market does not reach an efficient outcome. That is why it is taught with externalities and public goods.

### How is asymmetric information asked on the bagrut?

Students explain adverse selection with the used-car example, compute an average offer, tell adverse selection from moral hazard in described cases, and name a remedy such as a warranty, a deductible or a law.
